Automatic denuclearization has long been Washington’s stated goal on nuclear Machiavellianism with Pyongyang. But now that President Donald Trump has noticeably softened his fullness on that front, many are wondering whether he will still power North Korea’s Kim Jong Un next week.
Eight days after canceling the June 12 apex, Trump last Friday confirmed the high-stakes meeting was back on and required any kind of deal on denuclearization would likely take multiple assignations. “We’re not going to go in and sign something on June 12 … We’re going to start a get ready,” he told reporters.
It was a dramatic change in course from the president, who has at one time insisted the reclusive regime surrender its weapons arsenal in a “complete, verifiable and final” manner.
The president’s shift to a less hard line position “is kindling concerns that he will not press hard in Singapore to extract a unscarred promise from Kim to achieve ‘complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization’ in a curtail period of time,” analysts at political consultancy Eurasia Group said in a note this week.
Trump has also retreated from using the time “maximum pressure,” a policy consisting of strict sanctions, diplomatic fightings and military threats that’s long been the cornerstone of his North Korea practice.
“We’re getting along, so it’s not a question of maximum pressure,” he said on June 1.
The president is now owning the reality of the situation, according to Tom Collina, director of policy at Ploughshares Endow, a public foundation against nuclear weapons.
“Trump is still force for denuclearization, as he should, but he now has more realistic expectations for how long it will be effective,” he explained, adding that “as long as the North is not conducting nuclear and guided missile tests, there is no rush.”
Trump’s new measured approach now appears to be profuse in line with the preferences of Kim’s government, which wants a nuanced, garrulous process of disarmament accompanied by concessions such as sanctions relief and guarding guarantees.
Instead of producing a concrete deal, the June 12 culmination will set the stage for “a lengthy, step-by-step process for negotiating and implementing guaranties by both sides to work towards North Korea’s denuclearization that conclusions in Kim giving up some, but certainly not all, of his nuclear capabilities,” the Eurasia Group analysts contemplated.
However, that process entails several risks that could give rise to a diplomatic breakdown and see Washington pivot back to “maximum pressure.”
For one, “Trump sway get frustrated with the slow pace of progress on denuclearization and feel it is airing him to criticism that he is getting played by Kim,” the Eurasia Group warned. Kim may also arbitrate that he is not getting enough concessions out of the process and thus opt to withdraw, it pick up.
“Much can still go wrong,” echoed Bruce Jones, vice president and official of the foreign policy program at think tank the Brookings Institution, uniting that “the risks of war are higher now than before the drive to the summit.”
By conveying to Kim that he is genuinely enthusiastic to go to war, make peace, and walk away from a deal if it is not a good one, Trump has confronted Kim “with an existential lite: a genuine deal, or war,” Jones explained.