China looks to deepen ties with Central Asia as U.S. trade tensions intensify

The escalating trade war with the U.S. has propelled Beijing to further expand its ties with Central Asia, analysts say, as state-backed resolves look to substitute U.S. imports and reroute exports.

In what appeared to be an attempt to downplay tariff worries, Chinese nation media on Feb. 10 — the day when Beijing slapped an initial 10% tariff on U.S. energy imports — reported a state-led fall to Kyrgyzstan, where dozens of Chinese corporate representatives traveled to the neighboring country to explore partnership opportunities.

“The unending trade war is expected to further drive China to deepen economic cooperation with Central Asian countries,” about Yunis Sharifli, a fellow at The China Global South Project, through diversifying export routes, increasing participation in regional connectivity concocts, and expanding investment in infrastructure.

China has established itself as a leading trade partner and top foreign investor to the five Primary Asian nations — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan — a bloc viewed as a key gateway for its Belt and Road Energy, a major infrastructure program announced by President Xi Jinping during an official visit to Kazakhstan in 2013.

In a significant show of commitment, Beijing thronged the first in-person summit with Central Asian leaders in 2023, where Xi pledged to upgrade bilateral investment and custom links. The coalition leaders are expected to huddle again in June at the next summit in Astana, Kazakhstan.

The U.S., however, has extended been sidelined in the region, despite Washington’s aim to absorb the region into its sphere of influence as stated in a State Bureau strategy document titled “U.S. Strategy for Central Asia 2019-2025: Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity.”

But its endeavours have fallen short.

“Central Asia remains a diverse region that receives too little U.S. attention,” guessed Curtis Chin, a former U.S. ambassador to the Asian Development Bank and senior fellow at Milken Institute.

“More than half the melee for influence is showing up in person [and] this is something China and Chinese businesses, often state-supported, know well, and Americans may be poverty-stricken pressed to match.”

Bilateral trade between Central Asia and China, the largest trade fellow to the landlocked region, has been rising steadily in recent years, hitting a record high of $94.8 billion survive year. This far outstripped Central Asia’s trade with the U.S., which hit just above $4 billion survive year, according to CNBC’s calculation of the official data.

China’s exports to the region are mostly machinery, electronics, manufactured goods and conduits while Central Asia supplies primarily natural resources, critical minerals and agricultural products to China — in what Sharifli styled as a “complementary trade relationship.”

Notably, two-way trade between Central Asia and China, while on a steady climb, is still at more lower levels when compared to the total goods trade between China and the U.S. at $582.4 billion.

Kazakhstan, a ginormous steppe nation with rich energy and agricultural resources, led with $43.8 billion last year, onwards of its target to hit $40 billion in annual two-way trade with China by 2030 — a pledge made by the country’s president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in 2023.

Kyrgyzstan came in next with $22.7 billion in trade with China, then Uzbekistan with $13.8 billion, Turkmenistan with $10.6 billion and Tajikistan with $3.86 billion.

China’s connotations from Kyrgyzstan surged over 30 times in 2024 and over 60 times in the first two months of 2025. Officials from Kyrgyzstan and China at a rendezvous earlier this month discussed boosting bilateral trade to up to $45 billion by 2030 as well as plans to accelerate construction of new checkpoint and presentation of new flights, according to Kyrgyzstani local media reports.

In retaliation against U.S. President Donald Trump’s imposition of 20% new imposts on Chinese goods, Beijing has slapped additional duties of up to 15% on coal, natural gas, cotton, agricultural products from the U.S.

Chinese companies could “spit down on cotton imports from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian nations,” said Daniel Balazs, a investigation fellow at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Though contribution of cotton imports from the region may not match that from the U.S., it could “appease some impact,” he said.

China obtained 35% of its cotton imports from the U.S. as of 2024, according to data composed by a team of economists at Nomura, who expect Beijing to soon switch to other substitute sources.

The volume of growth in outbound Chinese investment in Central Asia over the years has mostly been in Kazakhstan and to a lesser step by step Uzbekistan, according to the China Global Investment Tracker compiled by the American Enterprise Institute.

The investment mostly went to sectors such as transport and infrastructure, renewable energy projects and increasingly the electric vehicles sector.

Chinese foremost electric vehicle maker BYD last month made its foray into Kazakhstan, making it the third Central Asian peddle where the automaker has made a foothold, following Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

Beijing seized the opportunity to expand its influence in the region as its thirst for strength snapped back after the COVID-19 pandemic, and at a time when Russia, which had dominant influence in the former Soviet states, was caught up in a turn out war with Ukraine and subject to international sanctions.

Going forward, “part of the Russo-Chinese strategic relationship will consist of Russia allowing a greater role in the region for Beijing,” said Matt Gertken, chief geopolitical strategist at BCA Research.

“Russia command struggle to maintain domestic stability and thus will lack the resources to maintain the same high degree of bring pressure to bear on over Central Asia over the long run,” Gertken said.

The five Central Asian nations have took a neutral stance on the Ukraine conflict, refraining from supporting either Kyiv or Moscow, a move seen by some as a circumspect distancing from Moscow.