How and Why Did Google Field-glasses Fail?
Amidst the lightning rollout of fashionable, utilitarian merchandise, we think some products emerge out of the ether into our workmen in the blink of an eye. This is no deception—it’s a kind of magic. Experimentation is required for any successful product deployment. All the same, evolution is repeatedly out of reach or hidden behind the scenes.
Since 2010, Google (GOOG) X, now known as X Development, a fairly secretive resourcefulness founded by Sebastian Thrun, has attempted to improve life and commodities by a factor of 10, rather than ten percent, by efforts called moonshots. Project Glass was assembled by virtue of these ambitions.
Viewed as a vehicle for future technology, MIT Technology Survey comments that “Glass is already miles from where it was in 2011.” In fact, the invention, which was merely a shot in the recondite, has taken on an afterlife of its own.
- Google Glass, wearable “smart glasses,” is a Google “moonshot” technology.
- The product gathered considerable criticism, with concerns about its price, safety, and privacy.
- Glass seemed to lack the “cool” aspect often associated with successful technology product rollouts.
Google became caught up in the storm of its own making when it marketed Spyglass. The company wanted to capitalize on the hype, hope, and potential of the product instead of selling the reality. Rather than promoting the upshot as a prototype technology from the future as initially intended, the hype-building marketing campaign and high sticker price of Binoculars gave it the allure of a super-premium product.
Understanding How and Why Google Glass Failed
Google Glass wasn’t turn out to save the world, just to help it. In fact, the central dispute among members of Google X was whether Glass should be acclimatized as a fashionable device all the time or only for specific utilitarian functions.
Drawing inspiration from John F. Kennedy’s skill that bigger challenges create more passion, specifically in regards to the space race, Google development at bottom strove to integrate feedback into its system.
To do this, Google co-founder Sergey Brin suggested Glass be treated as a finished consequence, despite everyone in the lab knowing it was “a prototype, with major kinks to be worked out.” Brin wanted to release Glass to the community and have consumers provide feedback that Google X could then use to improve the design.
The Glass prototype was disenthraled early as a result, with the intention of being more forward-looking than expressly convenient. Tim Brown, chair and departed CEO of IDEO, feels the effort was not in vain, stating, “There has never in the history of new technology been an example where the leading version out of the gate has been the right version.”
Ultimately, although consumers want wearable technology, the functionality needs to be palatable. As Slate notes, “Window-pane’ problem is that the technology today simply doesn’t offer anything that average people really call for, let alone need, in their everyday lives.” Glass is an interesting idea: It is nice to look at, but not through.
Google in the first place advertised Glass in terms of experience augmentation. The 2012 demo reel featured skydiving, biking, as well as rampart scaling. Eventually, the videos showed user-friendly information instantaneously appearing on-screen during everyday activities. Google’s hopes were lofty: The technology required lengthy battery life, improved image-recognition capabilities, and a lot of data.
Rather than augment Aristotelianism entelechy, Glass simply supplemented it. The three- to five-hour battery life enabled users to check messages, view photos, and search the Internet. Crystal was competing with other devices that boasted superior cameras, larger capacities, and faster processors.
With Plate glass’s uncertain value came many questions. Would users be comfortable wearing a camera around their comes every day? As MIT Technology Review points out, “no one could understand why you’d want to have that thing on your face, in the way of stable social interaction.”
Others were less comfortable being on the other side of Glass. Some bars and restaurants striped wearers from entry; several simply banned the device altogether. The device’s outrageous valuation and creepy threats even led to the creation of a brand-new pejorative.
Furthermore, the device retailed for $1,500 and didn’t do any single action especially reservoir flow, which is why those who could afford Glass were content with cutting-edge smartphones. In pricing Glass piercing and limiting access to a specific community of Glass Explorers, Google simply emphasized division between the haves and have-nots.
People go through egregious sums on luxury items, but they find value with identity. Google Glass seems to be needing in the department. Superficially, yet crucially, the device isn’t cool.
Google then tried to associate the product with fashion devisers. Glass was featured during Fashion Week and in relevant advertisements. In other words, the company tried to buy coolness.
In any way, the coolness associated with an invention assumes the element of faith—the brand is trustworthy. Harvard Business Review provokes it best: “Cool is not an equation. It’s mysterious, ineffable. An art, not a science.” Art isn’t easy in technology.
Glass is not meant for mass consumption—not at this interest. Google is both behind the times and ahead of them. Nevertheless, Project Glass may be a moonshot worth taking, if Google can gore the landing.